The metaphysics of individuation by Human, Leon

ABSTRACT
THE METAPHYSICS OF INDIVIDUATION
Human, Leon, M.A. University of the Witwiitersrand, 1989
A study of ".omething as fundamental as the conditions of individuation is problematized by 
one's own immersion in that practice. This dissertation is concerned with the scrutiny and 
development of the metaphysics inherent in ev jryday individuation. It examines in somo detail 
the attempts of David Wiggins in his Sameness and Supstance. to achieve greater theoretical 
self-consciou ;ness concerning the practice and its presuppositions. W^jgins claims that luman 
individuators of three-dimensional continuants a e committed to an ontology of substance s. His 
overall programme consists in showing how His ontology is groundix! in a practice which 
necessarily enp'oys sortal predicates.
A central problem relates to the evaluation of some of Wiggins' descriptive claims regarding 
the practice of singling out. It is not always clear that these claims are purely descriptive; they 
are often stipulative, often overdose ript-ions Insofar as large parts of Wiggins’ programme 
depends on the denial of sortally relativized identity, some attention is given to this latter 
doctrine. It is claimed that Wiggins' own position on identity is not orthodox enough. 
Furthermore, even in its own terms his construal of identity ne9d not presuppose his major 
thesis, namely, the sortal dependency of individuation.
A major question facing the substance oncologist is that of essentialism. This issue is examined 
with reference to natural kinds and universals. It is argued that a commitment to sortally 
dependent individuation need not imply a commitment either to kinds as abstract objects or to 
substantival univeisais. Some attention is given to Wiggins' own attempt to derive essent'alism, 
and it is concluded that his derivation is seriously flawed both in its method and in some of its 
premisses.
The metaphysics of individuation emerges as a complex structure deserving of careful study. 
It is not intractable to such changes as are necessitated by scientific discoveries, or perversely 
simple-minded. Care needs to be taken, however, in the circumscription of the conceptual 
practice of individuation within which this metaphysics is embodied. While re-identification is 
impossible without sortals, it is concluded that this has not been established for individuation 
as such.
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INTRODUCTION
(0
This essay attempts to examine the ontological presuppositions of the practice of individuation. 
It does so by means ol a critical reading of one of the most substantial and comprehensive 
treatments of the subject, that of David Wiggins. The complexity and variety of issues he 
raises in Sameness and Substance make it impossible, in an essay of this length, to do full 
justice to his work as a whole. I have completely ignored the final chapter on personal identity, 
and almost completely chapter five, 'Conceptualism and Realism’. My reasons for following 
mis procedure are different in each case, although they can be reduced to the realization that 
a consideration of either chapter would result in two more essays equal in length to the present 
one. The corpus of writings on the subject of personal identity is at once so massive and 
specialized as to make cursory treatment here inadvisable. On the other hand, the generality 
and all-comprehensiveness of the ciaims in chapter five would require such detailed spelling- 
out that the specificity of focus on individuation per se would be lost.
I follow Wiggins in further limiting myself to the individuation of threo-dimensional material 
objects. The concern is not with the singling out of individuals in general, where this could 
include things like visual-impressions or numbers. There are more than enough profound and 
fundamental problems within this circumscribed conceptual space to justify such limitation. My 
interest is (obviously) philosophical, not historical, and contemporary. I shall therefore employ 
the method of conceptual analysis presently current in analytic philosophy. One is. 
unfortunately, forced to utter such ban* is as the above because of the fashionable call to 
historize before one philosophizes. Whik may be true that I shall grasp Aristotle's intent only 
conditional uoon my reincarnation in a Greek polis. I am not concerned with that ever elusive 
original meaning. Within the philosophical world, the term 'Aristotelian nominalism’ has a well- 
defined content, and that is what I refer to when I examine the historical roots of Wiggins own 
nominalism in Aristotle.
In the first chapter I attempt two things. The first is to show that counterexamples to the 
classical conception of identify as exhausted by reflexivity are empty. This is plodding work, 
and although I mostly follow Wiggins' lead, a reductive strategy is arrived at at the end of 
section one. In the second section, I isolate a lacuna in Wiggins' treatment of the opposing 
position, that of Relative Identity, and proceed to argue against the Geachian theoretical 
argument in favour of such a non-classical view of identity. My second main concern in chapter 
one arises directly out of the results of the first two sections. If the Relative Identity view is 
false, it cannot support Wiggins’ main thesis, namely, the Serial Dependency of Individuation 
or D. I therefore attempt to formulate alternative grounds for D, based on the notions of 
becoming and conceivability. Neither of these attempts appear to be successful. It should be
noted that these arguments for D are explicitly formulated as arguments for the substance- 
sort&i/phase-sortal distinction postulated by Wiggins. The datails in section three make it clear 
how arguments in favour of this distinction are simultaneously arguments tor D.
Chapter two is organized around three concerns, these being divided between sections one to 
three, section four and section five. The first three sections attempt to extract from Wiggins' 
writings the strongest possible argument in favour ol thesis D, an argument broadly Kantian in 
spirit and one which Wiggins himself never explicitly formulates. Section one sets the stage by 
introducing the philosophical terminology necessary for arguments which claim to isolate those 
presuppositions which render a conceptual practice possible. Some attention is given to modern 
reappropriations of this so-called transcendental strategy’. The final version of a compleied 
argument is put forward in section three; and it is claimed that, although certain premisses such 
as that of irreducible predication in the category of substance are suspect, Wiggins can be 
pushed no further on this front. Section four questions a central doctrine of Wiggins’ position, 
namely the view that identity is to be cashed out as 'coincidence as a substance'. I employ 
Humean arguments against such a position in order to show that identity at a time exhausts the 
concept of identity. Insofar as I accept that sortals are linked to identity criteria, the position 
arrived at here opens up the possibility of individuation without sortals, an issue taken up in the 
final section. I attempt to show, in section five, that the denial of transtemporal identity as a 
datum need not lead to a radical debunking of the present conceptual scheme. This will be 
the case if the unification of momentary objects into a single history can be achieved on a non- 
conventional basis. I follow Sydney Shoemaker in attempting such a reconstruction. 
Throughout I maintain that such a reconstruction is compatible with Wiggins’ claim that there 
are no pr -nitive synchronic concepts of contintuants. It is also claimed that Wiggins’ own view 
of what a momentary reconstruction should look like is unduly simplistic and naive. The central 
claim of the second chapter is that Wiggins gets the metaphysics of individuation wrong because 
he overdescribes the practica of singling out.
The final chapter has broadly speaking, two aims. The first is a vindication of Wiggins' self­
description as a nominalist, and the second a critique of his derivation of essentialism. The 
first concern is spread out over the first three sectionr, and relates to Wiggins' acceptance of 
Putnam's theory of natural kind terms (sections one and two) and the question of universals 
(section three). Putnam's programme is examined in some detail, and he is seen to be 
committed to a second-order essentialism relating to kinds as abstract objects. I claim that 
Wiggins' appropriation of the theory need not force him into a similar commitment. Some 
prominence is given to Wiggins’ view that particulars belong essentially to their actual kinds. 
Section three utilizes an Aristotelian conception of universals to argue against kinds as abstract 
objects. I also give a brief critique of the regularity theory of natural laws in order to tie in 
Wiggirio insistence on the nomological basis of kind-membership with his acceptance of a 
scientifically determined real essence. The final section shows firstly, that Wiggins’ derivation
of essentialism is no such thing, because the essentialism is present in his premisses. It is 
claimed, in the second place, that the project of derivation is itself flawed, no! only because it 
relies on what can and cannot be conceived, but also because of the dilemma Wiggins' faces 
when he proceeds from the essential properties of sets to those of material objects.
CHAPTER I
IDENTITY IS A MANY-SPLENDOURED THING : the classical conception of Identity 
redeemed
The present chapter is introductory in two ways. Firstly, it attempts to provide a philosophical 
context for some of Wiggins' theses by arguing against a v i3w wh'ch has often been construed 
as favouring that of Wiggins. In the second place, the considerations adduced in support of 
Wiggins’ main thesis (D), that is, the claim that all identity statements should be sortalized (i.e.. 
provided with a general covering concept such as dog' or 'spade'), are of an informal and 
inconclusive nature.
In sections one and two, I examine Wiggins’ arguments against the so-called Relative Identity 
view (R), according to which a and b can be identical under a predicate T while being distinct 
unde another predicate '3’. I attempt to show that while R does entail D, it cannot support 
D. In the remaining section, I examine informal and broadly intuitive considerations in favour 
of substance sortals. The full import of these ’quasi-Aristotelian’ suggestions will only become 
evident in chapter three, where they are developed in the context of issues renting to natural 
kinds and universals.
Section 1 
Apparent True Instances of R Considered
Wiggins commences his dark and difficult Sameness and Substance (SS) with a question, the 
affirmative answer to which encapsulates the Relative Identity view or R, viz.. *... whether a 
can be the same f as b, and not the same g as b, even where a or b is itself a g.* (SS). 
p.16).1
An affirmative answer to Wiggins’ question is not merely an indication of philosophical whim, 
or a pernicious attempt to undermine heartfelt intuitions. There are indeed cases which seem 
to support R, cases in which intuitions ride the waves of relativism. Consider Heraclitus, and 
what he swam in today and what he swam in yesterday. Is it not true that the referent of 
these two descriptions are the same river but rvoi the same water? If unreflective intuition 
agrees. this appears to be a true instance of R.*
* The sortal relativity of Identity is most intimately associated with the name of Geach (1968): *i could not object in 
principle to different As being one and the same 8 as different official personages may be one and the same man.’ 
(p. 157). I discuss only the Heraclitus example in detail.
* It is not to be supposed that intuition is universally naive. Exposure 10 theory net only informs but moulds it  Certain 
intuitive options are options no longer. Thus the theoretical can play havoc with 'pure' com.non-sense
A traditionalist may object that this conflicts with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, with the plausible 
principle that identicais have all iheir properties in common (or share all their predicates). And so 
it does. How can a be the same (anything) as b when a has a property which b lacks? What 
Heraclitus splashed in today was water, and a river. But then what he splashed in yesterday (ex 
hypothesi a river, not today’s water) does not have the property being (a) water Heraclitus splashed 
in today (the point can be made in terms of predicate-satisfaction, V it is douhted that sucn 
properties exist). However, since these are the same rive's, how can b possibly lack this property? 
It is of course open to the supporter of R to simply deny that the Indiscernibiiity of identicals, or 
Leibniz’s Law, is sacrosanct, i.e., that relative identical are indiscernible for all further predicates. 
If a and b cannot be rendered discernible by means of predicates presently available, it might very 
well be that they fail to satisfy all tne same predicates when that predicate-stock is expanded 
(assuming, of course, some sort of restriction on which predicates are to count as genuine, cf. SS, 
p.21, footnote 7). A person who denies R must therefore attempt to show, rather than merely 
assert, that Leibniz's Law is a necessary condition of numerical identity. This is a lacuna in 
Wiggins’ first chapter. He never addresses or considers Geach’s theoretical arguments against 
the traditional view which considers the identity predicate to be absolute. It may well be that all 
cases offered in support of R turn out in fact not to support it. But such a contingency is hardly 
conclusive, the classical identity theorist might have been fortunate. Perhaps other (yet-to-be- 
thought-of) oxamples il! conclusively support R.
I shall take these two components of the case against R in their proper order. Firstly, following 
Perry (1970), I shall attempt to show how one deals with purported counterexamples to the 
classical conception of identity as a reflexive relation conferring substitutivity.3 Secondly, I shall 
urge that there are no compelling reasons to accept Geach’s argument against the classical 
conception of identity.
At this stage, the general import of R may be expressed as follows:
(1.1) It is possible that A is the same f as B, but A and B are different gs.
This should not bo taken to imply that the Principle of Substitutivity of co-referential terms is equivalent to Leibniz’s Law. 
It is not. 1 he former is simply false, e.g., in Oratio obliqua contexts. Leibniz's Law is a material mode principle relating to 
objects and community of properties. I have usad 'substitutivity' in the text in order not to beg any questions against 
Wiggins' professed nominalism, i.e., so that it may be read as 'co-satisfaction of predicates’. While it is true that relative 
identity confers limited substitutivity, it is the very limitation which is in question here. Also, two objects may share properties 
under one predicate but need not therefore share al[ their properties (given, e.g., temporal properies).
Keeping this in mind, Perry's conclusion to his case against Geachian relativists 
counterexamples is suggestive:
"If 'A' and B’ refer to the same objects throughout [1.1], the first conjunct of [1.1J is not an 
identity statement, and the counterexample fails. K both conjuncts are identity statements in 
the required sense, ’A’ and B’ must refer to |fs] in the first conjunct and [gs] in the second, 
and the counterexample fails.” (1970 p. 189).*
Insofar as the R-therorist is committed to the truth of (1.1), the above quotation suggests a 
general strategy against R. In order to further develop this strategy, it is necessary to bring 
the (intuitr-ely) R-supporting excirrple involving Heraclitus into line with (1.1), thus:
(1.2) What Heraclitus swam in yesterday is the same river as what he swam in today, but 
what he swan in today and what he swam in yesterday are different waters.
Although the R-thecrisfs counterexamples can all be expressed in a form such as the above, 
this is not necessary, and I shall therefore dispense with such torturous reformulations unless 
absolutely unavoidable. It may nevertheless be contended that the supporting instances of R 
all share a certain grammatical form. However, it can easily be shown that not everything 
expressible in this grammatical form is necessarily an instance of R. Consioer:
(1.3) This curtain is the same colour as the carpet, but they are (of) different shapes.
In order to construe (1.3) as an identity statement, the following expansion is required:
(1.4) The colour of the curtain is the same (colour) as the colour of the carpet, but the 
shape of the curtain is a different (shape) from the shape of the carpet *
This makes of each conjunct an identity statement, which is a necessary condition on any 
purported counterexample to classical identity. However, if both are identities, they refer to 
different things (colours and shapes), i.e., there are four distinct terms. It is therefore evident 
that a grammatical form incorporating 'the same' is not sufficient to make of something an 
identity statement.
If it is conceded that (1.4) does not ?"ppor» R, the strategy utilized in so exposing it may be
4 I have substituted T and g' as general term variables. Perry considers 'word type1 and 'word token', which is not the 
example I want to develop. I have also used A for a in order to bring (1.1) inlo line with Perry's use.
* Cf. Michael Pendtebury, Identity Statements. Honours Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand. 1974.
extended to the prima facie supporting instance expressed in (1.2). The latter should then be 
rephrased as:
(1.5) The river Heraclitus swam in yesterday is the same (river) as the river he S' am in 
today, but the water he swam in yesterday is not the same (water) as the .^ater he 
swam in today.
What needs to be shown, taking a cue from Perry, is either that the component clauses of
(1.5) are not identity statements, or that the terms they contain are distinct, H the latter is the 
case, the following must be false:
(1.6) The river Heraclitus swam in today is the same (river/water) as the water he swam in 
yesterday.
How could one motivate for its falsity? Not by any straightforward appeal to Leibniz's Law. 
Although successful, I have temporarily bracketed such an appeal. A possible way out is 
suggested by Quine. While it may be said that a river-stage (what is swum in at t=today)is a 
water stage (the water
present at the place of swimming), any two stages of a river are not stages of the same 
waters. Quine views 'a water’ as a specific collection of molecules, and then concludes that 
no river is a water.*
An application of this insight to (1.6) makes its falsity self-evident. Consider the water Heraclitus 
swam in today. It is a collection of molecules. Now, although the river he swam in today is 
water, it is not water of such a sort, i.e., a specific set of molecules. But then it is false that 
the terms contained in (1.6) are the same. Hence, the river Heraclitus swam in cannot be the 
same anything as the water he swam in, these are distinct things which merely occupied the 
same place at a time, they are linked by a non-identity relation.
The acove Quinean point is more rigorously developed in Wiggins’ discrimination of a 
constitutive sense of 'is'. His position is that it is the limited ambiguity of 'is', the confusion 
between predication and constitution, which gives many of the R-examples an initial plausibility. 
"Rivers are indeed water but this means that water goes to make them up. 'Same water* is not 
therefore a covering concept for an identity statement identifying a river with something." (SS,
4
* Quine (1953), From a logical pcmt of view, pp 65-70. There is no need to feel that this invocation of Quine commits 
one to a four-dimensionai ontology. This may be seen from the final consideration of (1 6). There is therefore no 
need to follow Quine in construing 'this river1 as this rrvensh summation of momentary objects including this -nomentary 
objecr Note "hat I am not concerned to repeat Wiggins' strictures against Quine (cf SS, p 194, note 1.11). I am merely 
conoomed with what one is committou to as at this stage of the argument.
p.35). Note that this does not preclude the correctness of This is the same water as I washea 
in yestotfiy '; one could neglect to get rid of dirty water in a basm. If Wiggins is correct, and
(1.6) is accordingly false, then (1.5) must contain four terms in order to fte composed of iden'ity 
statements (a terminological point: for ease of exposition I use ’ideniity statemert' 'or both 
affirmations and denote of identity throughout).
Before turning to the remaining option, i.e., construing the component clauses of (1.5) as not 
composed of identity statements, something more should be said about constitution. The 
constitutive ’is’ is said by Wiggins to block inferences to the identity of an object and its matter. 
This emerges clearly in the discussion of artifacts, e.g., the possibility of assertions such as 
That heap of china (bits) is the jug you saw last time’. While it is predicatively true that the 
jug is constituted of china (not of china-bits, as Wiggins implies; ordinary jugs are not glued 
together out of little bits), it is not predicatively true tha*. it is china (a quantity of china). 
Wiggins invokes a life-histories principle in order to distinguish between any two artifacts made 
of the same matter: “....if they are one and the same collection of china-bitc. then their life- 
his:ories and durations must be the same." (SS. p.30). So, for any jug and any pot made out 
of "he same china, if the pot is made at a time t, then the jug cannot exist anymore.
The constitutive is’ also saves Wiggins’ theory of predication, to the effect that if something is 
f it is identical with some f (for appropriate substituends for T), from counterexamples of the 
sort advocated by Noonan (1978): "What constitutes a man is not identical with that man, but 
on my account it is identical with something which i§ a man, namely itself.* (p.573). If this 
were correct, something could be an f by constituting this f, and yet also be distinct from this 
f. Wiggins denies, rightly, I think, that what constitutes an f can be identical to any 1/
To return to the alternative reading of (1.5), i.e., one which ignores the four-term expansion 
and construes (1.2) as containing only two terms in its component clauses, it can now be 
argued that neither clause in question expresses an identity statement. For if the reference of 
■what Heraclitus swam in today' and "what Heraclitus swam in yesterday' is a river in both 
clauses, then the referent of the first will not be the same water as that of the seoond. This 
follows because neither o* these referents are waters (i.e., sets of molecules). If, on the other 
hand, .iiese phrases both refer to waters, the referents in (1.2) cannot be the same river since 
neither is (identical with) a river. In fact, this reading renders (1.2) false.
The above alternative suggests a reductive summary of the strategy against R. One simply 
shows that, for any instance of (1.1), the second dausc is irrelevant since neither 3 or b is a
PertiapG subs»-..-"^ things under kinds and saying what they are constituted of are simply two different kinds of 
predication so that being made of wood is as much a property (not a quality) of a table as being a table is. I cannot pursue this line of thought here.
(1.7) Phosphorus is the same planet as Hesperus, but not the same star;
provides no support for R. To see why, consider its expansion into a form akin to that of
(1.2):
(1.8) Phosperus is the same planet as Hesperus, but they are different stars.
(1.8) is senseless precisely because neither Phosphorus nor Hesperus is a star. Hence there
are not two separate relative identity statements.
Now, Wiggins appears to be fully aware of this, and he subsumes such examples under type-
(1) in his typology of would-be R-specimens. The typology is set out below (Cf. SS, pp. 23-
29).
Tvpe-(1): where g is the w ong covering co'tcept for both a and b, although a -  £• (1.8) 
is not an instance of R because Venus is not a star;
Type-(2): where a and b are distinct entities, so that the first clause of (1.1) is violated 
and no relative identity arises. Venus is not the same anything as Mars;
Type-(3): where both clauses of (1.1) are satisfied, and one has (ga or g£j & (-gb).
John Doe, the boy thought to be a dunce at school, is the same human being 
(f) as Sir John Doe the Lord Mayor, but not the same boy, because Sir Doe 
is not a boy (g);
Type-(4): where both clauses of (1.1) are satisfied, and one has (ga or gb) 4 (ga 4 - 
g{2). The jug and the coffee pot are the same Quantity of china (f), but not 
the same utensii (g);
Typ$-(5): again, both clauses of ( l . i )  are satisfied, and one has (ga or gb) 4 (ga 4 gb).
The Lord Mayor is the same human being as the managing director of Gnome 
Engineering, but these are d'Stinct official positions (g), which are contingently 
realized by one man.
What I am contending is that Wiggins’ subsequent refinements of putative R-instances is 
unnecessary, at a theoretical
level * Of course, in the service of comprehensiveness it may seem advisable to distinguish 
cases where a is g and b is not, from ones where both a and b are gs. However, in his 
discussion of cases of type-(4) or type-(5), everything hinges either on the imputation of 
ambiguity to the referring expressions, so that with disambiguation all semblance of support 
for R disappears’ , or on the uncovering of a non-identity relation (e.g., constitution or realization, 
which are relations weaker than identity), rendering the second conjunct of (1.1) vacuous.’* But 
then all of Wiggins' positive arguments merely generalize the phenomenon in (1.7) or (1.8), and 
hence justifies a reductive construal of both the strategy against R and Wiggins' typology of 
cases. This is not to say that i cannot concede that such generalization requires harder 
conceptual work than that involve*, in unmasking (1.7). The inappropriateness of 'same star' 
in the latter example is much more of a surface-phenomenon than the hypothesis that if x is 
constituted by china, it .s distinct from that quantity of china.
The prima facie supporting cases in favour of R have been shown to be answerable, ft is 
now time to turn to the theoretical considerations offered in support of R.
Section 2
The Theoretical Argument for R
Section 1 has been an attempt to show that certain putative examples of Relative Identity need 
not be understood as having the logical form they seem to have. In this I have largely followed 
Wiggins' own procedure, abstracting only from explicit invocation of Leibniz’s Law or the 
Indiscemibiiity of Identicals. Such invocation comprises the second, if overlapping, part of the 
consideration of R-examples, and hence of the case against R.
Wiggins formulates it as follows: "Provided we have Leibniz’s Law then, and provided ’is the 
same f as' is as Leibnizean as we can disprove any purported instance of R." (SS, p.19/20). 
It may be granted, for the purposes of this section, that 'is the same f as' is as Leibnizean as 
plain identity" But why suppose that Leibniz's Law is definitive of identity in either its sortalized
1 Cases of a type-3 variety are another matter, which I discuss in section three
’  See his discussion of Cleopatra's Needle (type-4) and the Rivera Express (type-5).
Employing a realization relation for the example concerning tfv> Chancellor who is the same man, but not the same 
official as the Mayor, one has: 'The official who is Chancellor is not the same official as the official who is Mayor, but 
they are (realized by) the same man' (cf. Dummett (1073), p 571).
"  Wiggins' formal reason for restricting Leibniz's Law to 'If x is the same f as y, then Px iff Py', for P as predicate- 
expression variable, relates explicitly to D or the Sortal Dependency of Individuation thesis Smce I am not concerned 
with D at present the equivalence of the restricted and unrestricted versions may be assumed Whether 0  is true or 
not wiD be considered later. If it is, there is supposedly a ‘ . philosophical motive tor enriching the predicate calculus 
by the addition of sortal and substantial-sortal variables, . '  (SS. p.38)
8
or unsortalized form? Wiggins gives various reasons. It is said, firstly, that the Leibnizean 
principle distinguishes identity from other relations which also have the formal properties of 
transitivity, symmetry and reflexivity (e.g., equality in pay). This might no doubt be the case for 
someone who already accepts that there are ’interesting’ congruence relations on the domain 
of elements of any first-order theory. By an inte'esting congruence relation’, I mean that if 
there is some covering concept f such that a and b are the same f, then for all g, if ga, then 
a and b are th<j s^me g (cf. SS, p. 18). It not at all clear that the R-theorist has been given 
any reason to believe in the need for such a congruence principle, and consequently, no reason 
to distingi-ish identity from other relations with similar formal properties.
The second reason involves likening the status of Leibniz’s Law to that of the Law of Non- 
Contradiction. Counterexamples to the former are said to be *... scarcely more impressive...’  
(SS. p.21) than counterexamples to the saner. However, it would seem *hat the issue to be 
addressed is that in the one case the counterexamples are more impressive, or at least have 
been found to be so by some philosophers.
The final reason I wish to refer to *s by far the most convincing. It charges the R-theorist with 
imputing needless complexity to a seemingly straightforward locution, one of the form ’t1 
designates z and t2 designates z'. Suppose that for any context P(), the results of substituting 
each term vary in truth-value. Assume also that P(x) expresses a property Q. How then could 
z both lack and have Q? "It is on pain of contradiction that we shall deny that every property 
of the bearer of t1 is a property of the bearer of t2,.„" (SS, p 22).
For those unimpressed Dy these quasi-formal considerations, Wiggins offers a more rigorous 
formal proof of the incompatibility between the reflexivitv and congruence properties of identity 
and R (more specifically, with the weaker and sortally restricted versions of these properties). 
I shall not reproduce the proof in all its detail here (cf. SS, pp.19/20). it proceeds by taking 
the predicable ‘a is the same g as something/a is the same g as x' as a substituend for the 
predicate-variable P in the consequent (i.e., Pa iff Pb) of an instance of a restricted version of 
Leibniz’s Law, whose antecedent states that 'a is the same f as £’. Since the R-theorist grants 
that a is g (cf. types (3-5) above) Wiggins can derive a is the same g as a', as well as a is 
the same g as by substitution of the chosen predicable. Two applications of modus ponens 
yield the derivation of a is the same g as hence contradicting R.
I initially thought that the R-theorist should object to this line of argument by questioning a is 
the same g as something'. It seemed to me that acceptance of this as a predicable begs the 
question, as far as D is concerned, in Wiggins' favour. However, this would only be the case 
if, as I thought, the idea that everything is something necessarily underlies the idea that 
everything is identical to something, and * acceptance of the former meant commitment to D.
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